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Excerpt for President Trump's Open Letter; From Jean-Marc LeBouquin by , available in its entirety at Smashwords

President Trump's Open Letter;





From Jean-Marc LeBouquin



Copyright © August 8, 2018; Jean-Marc LeBouquin – illustrations under same copyright.

A Smashwords Edition:

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Thank you for your very kind regard.



* * * * *

President Trump's Open Letter; From Jean-Marc LeBouquin

Dear Mr. President;

Relieved to some extent, I thank you for your decision withdrawing United States cooperation from United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) – which many know colloquially as the "Iran nuclear deal;" yet which might as well be more appropriately known as the "Iran nuclear weapons exchange deal."

United States withdrawal in some ways slows future damaging consequences of the deal, although it in no way mitigates the harm already done by past approvals of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets already undertaken;

And U.S. withdrawal from the deal in no way prevents, or has prevented or discouraged the other nuclear weapons States; France, Russia, the U.K., China; or the highly advanced major arms dealing, non-nuclear-weapons-State of Germany from enthusiastically proceeding with the Resolution 2231 program.

The putting in place of unilateral U.S. sanctions on individuals and corporations cooperating with aspects of the deal are constructive and helpful – but can only have limited effect. These cannot shut down the project and open up fundamentally necessary inspections on the Iranian nuclear weapons program which were terminated or are prohibited under Barack Obama's arrangement which he made in collusion with the Ministers of the Government of Iran.

The world-wide menaces provided for in the Security Council resolution can only be abated and remedied by a ruling from the International Court of Justice invalidating the resolution, throwing the whole thing out, and ordering participating States to reverse the harm done and bring their behaviors back into line with treaty and peremptory norm of general international law.

Proceeding to the details of the matter:

Resolution 2231, your predecessor Barack Obama's famous "Iran nuclear weapons exchange deal," allows that in exchange for Iranian allowance for some nominal International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of Iranian centrifuges; Iran receives the favor of the Security Council sponsored Resolution 2231 project which actively advertises to vendors world-wide; that the United Nations will (and currently does) sponsor the expediting and approving of participating vendors in the carrying out of their sales to Iran of nuclear weapons associated assets in combination with ballistic missile technologies when bundled together in a consolidated procurement package. This activity is carried out on an ongoing basis.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is prohibited from any knowledge of the exact contents of these bundled procurement packages, or any knowledge of the end-use or end-use location of these in Iran – only that these packages contain nuclear weapons associated assets listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2. The United States Government cannot ascertain any chain of custody of these nuclear weapons assets acquired by Iran – through any IAEA documentation or accounting.

In addition, Resolution 2231 has allowed Iran, since 16 January 2016, to actively engage in stipulated "…activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device;" this all while, again, preventing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from verifying that such sales and activities are not being somehow mysteriously being diverted to the development of nuclear weapons capacity.

* * * * *

As is well known, Resolution 2231 has established two United Nations sponsored bureaucracies: the Joint Commission, and its subordinate bureaucracy, the Procurement Working Group, to facilitate and expedite this ongoing project;

These are the very bureaucracies designated by Resolution 2231 to publicly advertise to vendors world-wide the United Nations sponsored Genuine Offer that the Procurement Working Group Agency will and does, seek out and promise to vendors world-wide, that the group will actively expedite, and approve of sales to Iran of nuclear weapons associated assets in combination with ballistic missile technologies in procurement packages; this on ongoing basis – as we shall soon review.

The proposition "justifying" this activity seems to be essentially; that if a theoretical person or nation State (for example Mr. or Ms. Iran; or Mr. and Ms. Leaderships of the Obama-era five permanent Member States of the Security Council) agrees to follow whatever commendable rules of the road the Ministers of the Government of Iran have decided that Iran will agree to adhere to; then that person is, or those persons are, therefore automatically allowed to subsequently violate whatever other rules of the road which Iran has decided not to accept.

It doesn't matter if the rules of the road happen to be long established international law, or even multilaterally signed treaty which Iran is Party to. If Iran doesn't accept particular aspects of law or treaty it doesn't want to deal with in so far as its nuclear program arrangement with Obama goes – then because Obama has agreed to concede that Iran need not comply with international law or treaties it is Party to, Iran need not comply. Obama had made it clear that Iran need not comply – so I suppose, as a U.S. citizen, that means that the United States should forever go along following Obama's and Iran's example of not complying to treaty to which it is Party to, or to peremptory norm of general international law either. Am I wrong – or is it just me?

Essentially – Barack Obama's agreement with Iran has actually, in writing, demanded that international law and treaty by curtailed by Barack Obama's superseding deal which he arranged with the Ministers of the Government of Iran.

That is the phony proposition justifying all of this weapons trading activity: that since a United States President made an arrangement with the Ministers of the Government of Iran, and the Security Council executed an off the cuff, on the fly vote in favor of the arrangement, then the deal becomes international law and everyone has to follow along.

That's one of the myths surrounding this illicit resolution – that a Security Council resolution is the equivalent of international law. Of course that's not true, and anyone in any position of power knows its not and the fabrication is only there to try and influence the public and drum up public anger against those who speak out against the inevitable dangers of this incredibly corrupt deal.

International reaction to the U.S. withdrawal amounted only to some bad noise squawking from the leaderships rendering material support for Iran's acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets – and, on the other hand, many applause from leaderships opposed to Obama's U.S. invitation to Iran to become one of the club-member nations armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles.

A Security Council decision is certainly not the equivalent of international law – despite the mistaken impressions of some, and the intentionally misleading statements of others. But one has to admit, Obama's is a pretty amazing arrangement.

You had been in business for a while before you took up a hankering for this presidential poli-ticking thing. You must be aware of and appreciate how interesting and novel the theory of Obama's approach is. He goes around town telling everyone that his is contract between Parties which can't be superseded by law – which rather supersedes established law should there be any conflict? It's an innovative modern method attempting to prevent the inevitable historic intrusive tampering and mere trifling harangues of interfering persons who might take umbrage at an oligarchy of foreign leaders (the Obama-era leaderships of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council) usurping unauthorized power to engage in whatever criminal contraband arms smuggling they want to use the clout of their combined offices to pull off right under the collective nose of humanity.

Naturally the remaining leaderships of the five permanent Members of the Security Council can't pull the stunt they've been pulling on the public and the electorates in front of the International Court of Justice. A petition to the Court seeking confirmation that Resolution 2231 is invalidated upon its conclusion (per Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties) due in part to its various egregious violations and its overall menace to peace and to the welfare of humanity; must be brought, with the evidence, before the Court.

The inevitable ruling is what's necessary to putting a halt to, and reversing the damages already done in the practice of the provisions of the resolution; it is also necessary as a means of putting the international community back on the previously universally agreed upon course.

Since this is, by necessity as Open Letter format writing, it must thereby be a succinct and short piece of writing. That being the case – then if I could do it, it must not be that very hard to put much of how Barack Obama enacted, implemented, and imposed his tin-plated despotic nuclear weapons approval transfer system upon humanity in a nutshell; so please bear with and I'll see if I can lay it down short.

* * * * *

Before directly addressing the issue on hand – I feel that in the interests of any attempt at getting a larger view of the situation; of making sense of the situation; general arguments in favor of Resolution 2231 must be taken into some account. Previously noted has been the argument that a Security Council resolution is the equivalent of international law. And naturally – the Court knows that is not distantly the case.

Another well-known argument, following here, is perpetrated by prominent Democratic Party Senate Leader Diane Feinstein (among the others);

Democratic Party U.S. Senator Diane Feinstein; one of the major hard-line United States proponents of the project dedicated to the expediting and approving of Iranian acquisitions of declared nuclear weapons associated assets in combination with ballistic missile technologies, on 26 April 2018; pronounced this following:

The Iran nuclear agreement is the strongest nonproliferation agreement ever negotiated. It blocks Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon, protecting our security and the security of our partners in the region.

[Source: CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 164; No. 68: (page S2456), WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2018]

The general essence of this argument in favor of Resolution 2231 is the unsupportable assertion that the Security Council resolution will somehow block "Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon."

The documented facts, which will we soon review; tell us that the United Nations has established and sponsors, under the auspices of Resolution 2231, a documented procurement channel which is mandated to induce and encourage vendors world-wide to present sales offers to Iran of ballistic missile, and nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies and support services to be combined in one secured procurement package acquisition.

Not one proponent of Barack Obama's Iran nuclear deal" has ever publicly ventured to explain or reconcile how ongoing United Nations promoted and approved of sales to Iran of ballistic missile, and nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies and support services, to be combined in one secured procurement package acquisition; can possibly guarantee that the practices undertaken under the auspices of the provisions of Resolution 2231 will somehow mysteriously block "Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon."

In response to the intransigent supporters of Obama's "Iran nuclear weapons exchange program," their empty boasts and phony political posturings; I submit these following facts, the details of which you know Sir; but of which I ask your patience in the review of in consideration that this writing is, after all, an open letter; also addressed to the reading public, many of whom are already very familiar with the material, and many of whom might not be so familiar with the details of the subject matter.

* * * * *

The Procurement Working Group formally declares that it actively seeks out prospective vendors in its Procurement Working Group issued document "Information on the Procurement Channel;" under heading B. Further questions and answers; paragraph 18, as follows:

Information on the Procurement Channel

B. Further questions and answers

18. Can a proposal include items which are set out in S/2015/546 as well as in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev. 10/Part 2?

A proposal may include items which fall both under S/2015/546, as well as one of the INFCIRCs. Such a proposal should be submitted for review as an activity falling under Paragraph 2 of Annex B of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). The Security Council will decide on such proposals based on a recommendation of the Joint Commission.

That paragraph is found in the United Nations issued document "Information on the Procurement Channel" which is recovered from the United Nations website page: http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/restrictions-nuclear.shtml

The page directly accessing the document in question is: https://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/pdf/Information%20note_EN.pdf

It is well-known to vendors world-wide; that the alpha-numeric code "S/2015/546" refers to the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex; and the alpha-numeric code INFCIRC/254/Rev. 10/Part 2, (updated from the earlier latest version: INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2) refers to nuclear weapons associated goods, support services and technologies such as, for example:

International Atomic Energy Agency; [information Circular] INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2

Annex – List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, And Related Technology

IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2a (Date: 13 November 2013) ;

6. Components for Nuclear Explosive Devices

6.A. EQUIPMENT, ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS

6.A.1. Detonators and multipoint initiation systems

6.A.2. Firing sets and equivalent high-current pulse generators

6.A.3. Switching devices

6.A.4. Pulse discharge capacitors

6.A.5. Neutron generator systems

6.A.6. Striplines

6.B. TEST AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

6.C. MATERIALS

6.C.1. High explosive substances or mixtures,

6.E. TECHNOLOGY 6 – 4

6.E.1. "Technology" according to the Technology Controls for the "development", "production" or "use" of equipment, material or "software"

DEFINITIONS

"Development" --

is related to all phases before "production" such as:

• design

• design research

• design analysis

• design concepts

• assembly and testing of prototypes

• pilot production schemes

• design data

• process of transforming design data into a product

• configuration design

• integration design

• layouts

"Technical assistance" --

"Technical assistance" may take forms such as: instruction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services.

Note: "Technical assistance" may involve transfer of "technical data".

"Technical data" --

"Technical data" may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories.

Reminding, with an excerpt from the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex; what that list is about:

Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex

CATEGORY I -ITEM 1

COMPLETE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

1.A.1. Complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) (≥300km "range" & ≥500kg "payload")

1.A.2. Complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAVs) (including cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones) (≥300km "range" & ≥500kg "payload")

1.B.1. "Production facilities"

1.D.1. "Software"

1.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 3

PROPULSION COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT

3.A.1. Turbojet and turbofan engines

3.A.2. Ramjet/scramjet/pulse jet/combined cycle engines

3.A.3. Rocket motor cases, 'insulation' components and nozzles

3.A.4. Staging mechanisms, separation mechanisms and interstages

3.A.5. Liquid and slurry propellant (including oxidisers) control systems

3.A.6. Hybrid rocket motors

3.A.8. Liquid propellant tanks

3.B.1. "Production facilities"

3.B.2. "Production equipment"

3.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 17

STEALTH

17.A.1. Devices for reduced observables – such as radar reflectivity, ultraviolet/infrared signatures and acoustic signatures (i.e. stealth technology), for applications usable for the systems specified in 1.A. or 19.A. or the subsystems specified in 2.A. or 20.A.

17.B.1. Systems specially designed for radar cross section measurement

17.C.1. Materials for reduced observables – such as radar reflectivity, ultraviolet/infrared signatures and acoustic signatures (i.e. stealth technology), for applications usable for the systems specified in 1.A. or 19.A. or the subsystems specified in 2.A.

CATEGORY II -ITEM 18

NUCLEAR EFFECTS PROTECTION

18.A.1. "Radiation Hardened" "microcircuits"

18.A.2. 'Detectors'

18.A.3. Radomes

18.E.1. "Technology"

CATEGORY II -ITEM 19

OTHER COMPLETE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

19.A.1. Complete rocket systems (≥ 300km range)

19.A.2. Complete UAV systems (≥ 300km range)

19.A.3. Complete UAV systems

19.B.1. "Production facilities"

19.D.1. "Software"

19.E.1. "Technology"

The combination of those two classes of inventories, "S/2015/546" and INFCIRC/254/Rev. 10/Part 2, are what the Procurement Working Group currently advertises world-wide that United Nations sponsored bureaucracy would like to see made available bundled in procurement packages for sale to Iran.

The question from vendors the Procurement Working Group sought to answer was if permission would be given to vendors world-wide to combine for sales of procurement packages to the Islamic Republic of Iran: assets associated with nuclear weapons capacity; combined with ballistic missile warhead delivery systems could be considered for review and acceptance.

The enthusiastically encouraging advertisement of the Procurement Working Group actively seeks to inform vendors world-wide that such sales will be considered for review and acceptance.

* * * * *

As mentioned previously, Democratic Party U.S. Senator Diane Feinstein declared, on 26 April 2018, this following:

The Iran nuclear agreement is the strongest nonproliferation agreement ever negotiated. It blocks Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon, protecting our security and the security of our partners in the region.

[Source: CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 164; No. 68: (page S2456), WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2018]

As mentioned previously, no proponent of Barack Obama's "Iran nuclear weapons exchange agreement" has discussed publicly on record how it is that any of them could possibly believe that the selling to Iran, in combined procurement packages; declared nuclear weapons associated assets along with ballistic missile warhead delivery systems; blocks Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon.

Another example of a promoter of the policy pushing the ongoing sales to Iran nuclear weapons associated assets along with ballistic missile associated assets is the French President Macron, who came over here in April of this year and, during his stay; while trying to convince you to continue to collude in Obama's Iran nuclear weapons exchange deal; divided his time somewhat so to take the opportunity to declare before Congress:

"As for Iran, our objective is clear. Iran shall never possess any nuclear weapons. Not now, not in 5 years, not in 10 years. Never.'

[Source: CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: Vol. 164; No. 67: (page H3512), WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2018]

Macron is another one of those pro-proliferation politician performers who just can't explain how he believes that the selling to Iran, in combined procurement packages of declared nuclear weapons associated assets along with ballistic missile warhead delivery systems; will somehow guarantee that "… Iran shall never possess any nuclear weapons. Not now, not in 5 years, not in 10 years. Never;"

And Macron's administration is one of the active offenders aggressively participating in expediting and approving sales to Iran of above cited inventories on an ongoing basis. He appears to want the public to believe that his hypocritical declaration is sincere; regardless if there might appear to be some conflict between what Macron says he promotes – and what he really does act on. The young Macron mocks himself and any who would follow along with him.

* * * * *

Promotion of Barack Obama's Iran nuclear weapons exchange deal was a sham performance from the beginning.

Just three days after Resolution 2231 was accepted by the Security Council on 20 July 2015, Barack Obama’s secretary of energy, Dr, Ernest Moniz; one of the lead negotiators of the Iran nuclear weapons exchange agreement, went before the United States Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and declared, on the 23rd of July:

"Under this deal, Iran will not engage in several activities that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including multiple point explosive systems. These commitments are indefinite." [18]

Of course the charlatan knew that statement to be complete nonsense. It had been agreed that Iran could begin engaging in such activity as early as JCPOA Implementation Day, which turned out to be 16 January 2016.

This following is how and where Obama's Security Council Resolution 2231 conceded to Iran that as of JCPOA Implementation Day, which turned out to be 16 January 2016, could begin practicing with multiple point explosive systems, &c.; the appointments desired in developing the capacity to produce effective thermonuclear warheads; or as Resolution 2231 words it: to engage in "…activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device:"

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex I – Nuclear-related measures

A. General

1. The sequence of implementation of the commitments detailed in this Annex is specified in Annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Unless otherwise specified, the durations of the commitments in this Annex are from Implementation Day.

Nothing is mentioned in Annex V, paragraph A – General; 1, mentioned above; indicates that the timeline for putting in to effect the very important Section T following below "…has otherwise been specified…;" therefore the following activities described under JCPOA Annex I; Section T have been permitted since JCPOA Implementation Day; 16 January 2016.

T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

82.1. Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.

82.2. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82.3. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82.4. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.

Furthermore, Resolution 2231 prevents the IAEA from investigating, chaperoning, overseeing any of this advertised activity which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device:"

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 prohibits the IAEA from inspecting any Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 listed or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 listed goods, technologies and support services associated; here's where it's done:

Resolution 2231;

Annex A – JCPOA

JCPOA Annex IV – Joint Commission

6.2. The Joint Commission will discharge its responsibility for reviewing and making recommendations on proposals for nuclear-related transfers to or activities with Iran through a Procurement Working Group.

6.8. Iran will permit the exporting state to verify the end-use of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent version of these documents as updated by the Security Council*) imported following the procedure under Section 6 of this Annex. Upon request of the exporting state, or if the Joint Commission deems necessary when approving a proposal for transfer, the Joint Commission will provide expertise to the exporting state, including experts, as needed, to participate in the end-use verification.

* Current update now being INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2

That paragraph asserts that the Joint Commission, takes it upon itself to, at its expedient whim; provide expertise to verify end-use or end use location.

To date [June 2018] there have been 24 Iranian acquisitions of Procurement Working Group sponsored packages of unknown content, and no history of any Joint Commission reporting on any end use or end use location of procured items which, as the Procurement Working Group advertises world wide, may include combinations of Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex listed items pertaining to ballistic missile associated goods, technologies and support services; those along with INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 nuclear weapons associated goods, technologies and support services.

This has been done while preventing the IAEA from attending any Procurement Working Group meeting having to do with INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2, or the previous INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2.

On October 26, 2017, Republican Senator David Purdue, along with Ted Cruz and four other Senators indicated that they were becoming suspicious of this strange policy. They sent a letter to Ambassador Nikki Haley requesting clarification over "Section T of the JCPOA:"

Uncertainty over the boundaries of Section T, regarding "activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device, still exist between the signatories of the nuclear deal. IAEA Director Yukiya Amano has stated that "more clarification would be helpful" regarding mandate of the IAEA for verifying Section T. As you have astutely noted, "The JCPOA made no distinction between military and non-military sites. ..."

Senator Purdue quotes IAEA Director Yukiya Amano as having declared that "more clarification would be helpful" regarding mandate of the IAEA for verifying Section T.

Everything listed in that above mentioned "Section T" references nuclear weapons associated inventories listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2. Naturally the IAEA is prevented by Resolution 2231 from reviewing any of this activity.

The mandate for IAEA verification has been made clear for decades; in Article III, Clause 1, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

That should be clear enough for the IAEA Director General. The IAEA is given the mandate, under multilaterally signed international treaty, to verify that there is no non-diversion going on in Iran. Yet at every turn the IAEA is prevented from performing on its obligation under treaty. And who or, and what is preventing that? Naturally it is the remaining signatories to former President Obama's famous "Iran nuclear weapons exchange deal;" Security Council Resolution 2231.

The representatives of Russia and China, as well as the representatives of the Governments of Germany and France and the Government of the United Kingdom, these along with the Government of Iran; these are the governments all banded together publicly advertising, in their United Nations sponsored document: "Information on the Procurement Channel;" that the United Nations is requesting of vendors world-wide that they submit proposals for sales to Iran of nuclear weapons associated assets in combination with ballistic missile technologies on an ongoing basis – and although the Procurement Working Group doesn't spell it out in the . "Information on the Procurement Channel" document – the promise has been made; none of these sales will be hampered or inhibited by any IAEA inspection.

As we all know so well, Article I of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT, declares the following:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

The leaderships of current Russia and China, as well as the leaderships of the Governments of Germany and France and the Government of the United Kingdom all know this very well.

Nevertheless, these leaderships assist, encourage and induce the singular, as of yet, non-nuclear-weapons-State Theocracy of Iran in its open ambition to acquire nuclear weapons capacity, control over nuclear weapons capability. They do so in knowing violation of Treaty.

* * * * *

RESOLUTION 2231 Security Council policy is in practice now; and it must certainly, most reasonably be construed as the international menace, brought on by known international forces – which include the political leaderships of three treacherous NATO partners States, which couldn't care less about committing their countries, and involving the NATO alliance in ongoing gross violation of treaty;

The leadership of those three NATO alliance States have clearly forgotten that the NATO alliance was formed primarily to defend Europe – the leaderships the U.K., France, and Germany have decided instead that it is time for NATO to splinter into partisan groups – they belonging to that partisan group which prioritizes giving material aid to the Iranian Government's development of nuclear weapons capacity and ballistic missile capability over the interests and safety of the various populations and peoples of Europe.

This latent European stance isn't anything new – it is well known that each of those nations have carried out extravagantly costly, hostile, savage campaigns against their neighbors. And it is evident that leadership elements in the Great Britain, France, and Germany of our era also want to experiment the practice.

One aspect of the hostile intentions of the French-German-British triumvirate is the provision in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231; to perpetually keep in motion – beyond the time when some or most of these politicians will have left or been kicked out of Office – the prohibition of IAEA inspections of any of the material aid given to Iran in the development of its ballistic and nuclear weapons capabilities.

The Security Council intends that the IAEA permanently be kept out from reviewing or assessing if the Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated inventories are not being diverted to the development of Iranian nuclear weapons associated capacity.

Examining how this scheme of forever keeping the IAEA out of critical inspections of Iranian nuclear weapons associated acquisitions is arranged:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex B: Statement

27. [first clause] All States may participate in and permit the following activities provided that approval is provided in advance, on a case-by-case basis, by the Security Council:

(a) the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 (or the most recent versions of these documents, as updated by the Security Council), as well as any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy water-related activities inconsistent with the JCPOA;

After ten years – the need for advance approval, or any approval at all would be dropped:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);

Annex B: Statement

[final clause of paragraph 2]

This paragraph shall apply until the date ten years after JCPOA Adoption Day, as defined in the JCPOA, except if the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion before that date, then the requirement to obtain approval in advance by the Security Council shall be suspended immediately and, beginning on the date of this suspension, the exceptions provided for in this paragraph shall continue to apply and all States may participate in and permit the activities set forth in this paragraph if they notify the Security Council and the Joint Commission at least ten working days in advance of each such activity on a case-by-case basis.

What Resolution 2231; Annex B; final clause of paragraph 2 means is, that after ten years the provision "…provided that approval is provided in advance, on a case-by-case basis, by the Security Council…" is dropped and replaced by: "… all States may participate in and permit the activities set forth in this paragraph if they notify the Security Council and the Joint Commission at least ten working days in advance of each such activity on a case-by-case basis."

That paragraph deletes the condition "…provided that approval is provided in advance." After the ten year probation period, which is to end on October 18, 2025; advance approval, or any approval from the Security Council is no longer a conditional requirement for Iranian procurement of inventories from the INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 list; and there is no longer any requirement for a case-by-case evaluation. The Joint commission only has to be informed.

Why then, one might wonder, is there any need at all to confer with the Joint Commission on the matter?

The Joint Commission would seem to serve only a secretarial function in this case; keeping tabs on what was being passed into Iran, almost as window dressing to give the appearance of legitimacy;

But there is something more to it than that. At the onset, the IAEA has been prohibited from inspecting and verifying that Iranian acquisitions of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2, and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 listed nuclear weapons associated inventories are not being diverted to the development of Iranian nuclear weapons capacity.

The final clause of Security Council Resolution 2231; Annex B; paragraph 2 asserts that the conditions set forth in Resolution 2231 will remain in place indefinitely after ten years.

The Joint Commission effectively must remain in its position indefinitely, even ten years hence and after, in order to keep a record of what the IAEA is not allowed to inspect. There has to be some sort of United Nations Security Council Agency kept in place in order to prevent the IAEA launching into certain critical areas of inspection.

The Security Council resolution intentionally provides that there is forever to be a Security Council Agency on the spot; which no matter how poorly planned or improvised, must be on the scene to maintain the Resolution 2231 doctrine reminding the IAEA that it is prohibited from looking into certain critical issues.

If there is any assistance needed on "inspection," or "verification" – the ad hoc "experts" of the Joint Commission must be always on hand as an excuse; ready to deny the International Atomic Energy Agency access, by replacing it in any instance where or when the IAEA seeks to fulfill its function of inspection of areas the Government of Iran feels uncomfortable with. That improvised ad hoc committee of "experts" of the Joint Commission must be on hand in perpetuity in order to prohibit any Resolution 2231 proscribed International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.

Resolution 2231 effectively attempts to write the first three Articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons out of existence:

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

The activities of the syndicate participating in the activities of the "Iran nuclear weapons exchange agreement;" and the objective of permanently preventing the IAEA from verifying that areas Iran considers as sensitive; that these aspects are not being used to develop nuclear weapons capacity – when it is not at all unlikely that these areas are exactly being used to develop a nuclear weapons; this is all naturally in violation of treaty, and it is in violation of something else neither acknowledged or remembered by almost anyone:

* * * * *

Recalling that the Government of Iran continuously pledges the extermination of neighboring populations; we look to the International Military Tribunal Control Council Law No. 10 definition of the internationally codified War Crime falling under the category of Crimes against Peace:

CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10

PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND AGAINST HUMANITY

1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:

(a) Crimes against Peace. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.

And who might be considered as responsible or accountable for participating in such activity?

2. Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he acted, is deemed to have committed a crime as defined in paragraph 1of this Article, if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d) was connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a member of any organization or group connected with the commission of any such crime or (f) with reference to paragraph 1 (a), if he held a high political, civil or military (including General Staff) position … or held high position in the financial, industrial or economic life of any such country.

This "Iran nuclear weapons exchange agreement" is an assault on a very serious aspect of codified peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted.

The handing off of nuclear weapons capacity by the Security Council to a government which regularly pledges its intent to extinguish neighboring populations or overthrow neighboring governments can most reasonably be construed by the Court, as serious participation in a larger plan, developed internationally, to take a consenting part in, and participate in, preparations for the repeatedly publicly pledged (by Iran) waging of a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances;

The United Nations has been transformed from an organization of States governed by a Charter – the Charter of the United Nations – guiding nations in maintaining peace; the U.N. has been recently converted by a handful of Nations, into a weapon of war – promoting the arming of belligerent States with the means to conduct escalating ideological warfare in the Middle East, and by proxy and transfer, on the Pacific Rim – and let's hope we don't have to see how far things might go.

The Security Council, along with the five permanent Member States of the Security Council, is not in any way authorized by the Charter of the United Nations to instigate or maintain any plan to participate in preparations by the Government of Iran supporting its repeatedly publicly pledged waging of a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances against any population the Government of Iran just so happens to deem as obnoxious;

And Article I of the NPT strictly prohibits any participation by any signatory to: "…in any way … assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices."

IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano did express the view that the Security Council might work the dispute out between them.

But the leaderships of those nations adhering to Resolution 2231 are working against international treaty and peremptory norm of general international law.

The very text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 testifies that your predecessor Mr. President; that previous President Barack Obama, did not adhere to rule of law in constructing or concluding his negotiation with the Ministers of the Government of Iran.

He proverbially agreed to follow rules of the road when he decided he would if he wanted, and subsequently allowed that by the agreement he made he was entitled to violate whatever rules of the road he and the Ministers of the Government of Iran didn't feel like bothering with.

Barack Obama has perhaps taught the world that the United States will now, by reputation, be expected to never dare approach recourse of the law in an attempt to correct a situation instigated by an United States administration.

Playing as though international law does not exist is, and has been, the winning game for Russia, China, the U.K., France and Germany along with Iran and North Korea.

Naturally, it is good to speak to, and try to reason with the leaderships of those nations; but I maintain that what really gives teeth to any negotiation with those governments supporting the Iran nuclear weapons exchange deal; is that your administration forms an international alliance of States party to the NPT, all intimidated by the international menace of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231;

An association of allied States as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Japan, Jordan, South Korea – along with the United States and many others which I can think of – could swell into the Court seeking remedy and recourse; seeking confirmation by the Court that Resolution 2231 was illegitimate in the first place; seeking confirmation of the following:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART V. INVALIDITY, TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES

*SECTION 2. INVALIDITY OF TREATIES

Article 53. Treaties Conflicting With a Peremptory Norm of General International Law ("Jus Cogens")

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

Following a ruling on that from the Court, this judicial application next comes in to play:

VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969

*PART V. INVALIDITY, TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF TREATIES

*SECTION 5. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVALIDITY, TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION OF THE OPERATION OF A TREATY

Article 71. Consequences of the Invalidity of a Treaty which Conflicts with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law

1. In the case of a treaty which is void under article 53 [above] the parties shall:

(a) Eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act performed in reliance on any provision which conflicts with the peremptory norm of general international law; and.

(b) Bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of general international law.

Which probably means that all previous sanctions put previously into place; would be automatically ordered restored by the Court, including this following from the earlier United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010); which had barred even Russia and China from making any deals with Iran regarding conventional and ballistic weapons systems and equipment:

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010)

8. [The Security Council] Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) ("the Committee"), decides further that all States shall prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel;

9. Decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities;

A ruling by the Court would force parties to make amends and: Bring their mutual relations into conformity with the peremptory norm of general international law.

Even the threat of such a Court ruling would likely put an immediate chill through the international community of insurers, and would-be umbrella insurers, and would-be vendors; all who would stand at risk that contemplated investments in potential contracts with Iran might be completely wiped out, vanishing into thin air in minutes, by a Court Ruling.

That potentiality right there is one of the most effective international sanctions which could be easily enacted by the Executive in effecting some serious restraint on the ongoing problem.

There is nothing to fear from any gang of partisan would-be obstructionists of the 115th Congress. For three years none have dared suggest even bringing United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 up for a vote in Congress, or even a discussion;

Would-be obstructionists of the 115th Congress have no law in support of Resolution 2231;

And regardless of the apathetic disinterest of 115th Congress in its abdication of any effective attention in the matter; there is the legacy of the earlier Congress of the United States; which, in the distant, earlier, almost forgotten era; did take an interest and would take the time to show concern, and did vote in favor of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That Treaty was recommended and endorsed by the Senate, to the President of that distant earlier period; and the Treaty was ratified, granting it the status as one of the supreme Laws of the Land; such made under the Authority of the United States Constitution.

* * * * *

You have the clarity of standing law and the pursuit of justice on your side – and I refer you Sir to an earlier Supreme Court case; the case of UNITED STATES v. CURTISS-WRIGHT EXPORT CORPORATION, (1936); decided: December 21, 1936.

This was also a case associated with the international smuggling of decidedly contraband weaponry into an already inflamed region in South America.

Under the Authority of enacted law, under the authority endowed by Congress, under order of the Statesman of the times, under Our Mr. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's order of implementation; the President's Agents nabbed certain miscreant smugglers and proceeded them through to the process of prosecution.

The resisting defendants claimed a demurrer, suggesting that charges brought against them were unfair and illegal, and the President was not endowed with any competency by the law to pursue the defendants' arms smuggling interests and activities under those charges. The demurrer, in some ways appearing to have some merit, hassled its way all the way up to the Supreme Court.

Without going through the ins-and-outs of the case in this letter; it suffices to say that the Court found against the gun-running defendants and confirmed the President's Constitutional Authority in the matter. Writing for the opinion of the Court – and in response to the various arguments raised by the defense, United States Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland observed:

It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power*, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations-a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.

* [The Congress had already passed a law allowing Executive response to gun-running smugglers, so the President wasn't deciding for himself that the smugglers' maneuver was illegal; it was the exertion of an act of Congress which gave the President the Power to implement action.]

In the handing down of the United States Supreme Court's decision on the case, United States Supreme Court Justice Sutherland, in his writing explaining the opinion of the Court, proves himself the thoughtful man who chooses his words of instruction carefully and considerately.

Justice Sutherland chooses the word "plenary" in pointing out "…the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations..."

United States Supreme Court Justice Sutherland reminds that it is by plenum that the framers of the Constitution decided to divide into three departments a Judiciary, a Legislature, and an Executive.

The Executive is the sole organ of the federal government elected nationally by the plenum of the various constituencies across the nation.

The individual Congressperson is the representative of an isolated neighborhood;

The President is the only nationally elected person recognized by a national (election) plenum of a sort; and as such has been established to speak as the: "…sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations…"

Justice Sutherland adds, in the Court's description of that Power: "…like every other governmental power, it: must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.

Clearly the President ideally works within the law and works to implement law. Naturally the Congress also plays its very powerful role in international relations – the Congress has the ability to decide (Necessary and Proper Clause) what U.S. laws the President is to negotiate for.

The Congress of a previous era; when there was a Congress which took an interest in such matters; had already decided that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT) was to be made under the Authority of the United States Constitution; and the previous President signed for its ratification. And thus the treaty was made under the Authority of the United States Constitution. That was accomplished in that bygone era, during an innocent time when the Congress of the United States took an active interest in such matters.

Thanks to a previous Congress and President; by that earlier exertion of Constitutional Authority, the NPT now applies to the United States. And the treaty also applies to the other multiple international Parties, signatories to the treaty;

These Parties include Germany, the U.K., France – as mentioned, all also NATO "allies" – and all of the leaderships of these particularly peculiar NATO "allies" working together to respond to the Procurement Working Group advertisement to vendors to submit proposals for sales to Iran of nuclear weapons associated assets in combination with ballistic missile associated assets.

These leaderships of Germany, the U.K., and France are some of the very ones responsible for putting out the advertisement in the first place. It's no mystery why the French partisan politician Macron came over here in April with his tawdry sales pitch attempting to pressure the U.S. Executive into staying in the deal.

The motives of his visit are no more of a mystery than his keeping from the French Citizen information of what the Government of France is deeply involved in. A French President's assisting a belligerent government in acquiring nuclear weapons associated assets in combination with ballistic missile capability which may one day be pointed at Paris or other great cities of France; that could be misunderstood by the French Citizen as an unfriendly gesture on the part of their sociopathic President.

By previous legislative enactment; by exertion of Constitutional Authority, the NPT now applies to the United States; and as Justice Sutherland has pointed out; the President may exercise his power to correct an issue – "a [power] which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress." The power has already been granted by the Constitution.

And the President has the duty to take this Resolution 2231, which represents in clear threat to the United States and other nations in its ongoing violations of international treaty and law.

* * * * *

Effectively, and as previously indicated, Obama's "Iran nuclear weapons exchange deal" amounts to a trade-off. Iran agreed to some concessions on allowing IAEA inspections in some areas; this in return for United Nations Security Council support in preventing IAEA inspections of Iranian engagement in "…activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device;" these of which has been allowed, by the Resolution 2231 arrangement, since 16 January 2016;

Iran also agreed to some concessions on allowing IAEA inspections in some areas; in exchange for the Security Council actively expediting and officially approving of Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets and ballistic missile associated assets combined in a neat procurement package; which the IAEA is again not allowed to investigate for the purpose of verifying that contents of any these procurement packages are not being diverted to the development of nuclear weapons capacity.

It doesn't make a lot of sense that the United States should have ever gone along with any of it.

Even the remnants of that partisan faction; the proponents of the "Iran nuclear weapons exchange deal;" I refer to that population which at this stage has taken control of the national level Democratic Party political machine – even they have begun voicing fear as to menace which they themselves are responsible for maintaining and supporting. Here's how they do it while sustaining high-brow imagined distance enough to shift blame onto others; I quote:

On 24 October 2017 Congressperson Barr of Kentucky says (page H8100 of the Congressional Record on that date):

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to sponsor H.R. 3898, the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions Act, which imposes the most far-reaching financial sanctions ever directed at North Korea.

Since 2006, North Korea has undertaken six nuclear tests and, earlier this summer, test-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching United States territory. The most recent nuclear device that the country detonated on September 3 had an estimated explosive power 10 times greater than the bomb dropped at Hiroshima. We must not allow the North to threaten a U.S. city with such weapons

Congressperson Barr of Kentucky is one of the ones who has never tried to explain how it is he could possibly believe that the selling to Iran, in combined procurement packages of declared nuclear weapons associated assets, those along with ballistic missile warhead delivery systems; blocks Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon;

And Congressperson Barr of Kentucky is one of the ones who, as far as I've been able to find on the Congressional Record, has never investigated the contents of inventories listed on INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2, and subsequent INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2.

Congressperson Barr of Kentucky is one of the ones who, so far as I been able to find, has never publicly put it together that there might be some obscure connection between the Procurement Working Group's feeding to North Korea's best trading buddy Iran, the kind of nuclear weapons associated assets being approved for Iranian acquisition, the end-use and end-use location of which no one will allow to be publicly accounted for;

Congressperson Barr of Kentucky is one of the ones who, so far as I been able to find, has never publicly put it together that there might be some obscure connection between the special case suspension of international treaty for to accommodate Iranian special interest engagement in "…activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device;" that and the sudden exponential increase in thermonuclear firepower of North Korean nuclear weapons warheads,

Congressperson Barr of Kentucky is one of the ones who, so far as I been able to find, has never indicated publicly that it ever occurred to him that this activity of handing off to Iran, nuclear weapons capacity along with the latest in ballistic missile associated technologies off the Missile Technology Control Regime; Equipment, Software and Technology Annex; might have anything to do with the sudden exponential increase in the range of North Korean ballistic missiles;

I move immediately to comments made by Congressperson Waters, a leading major proponent, advocating the United Nations sponsored adventure of expediting and approving Iranian acquisitions of nuclear weapons associated assets along with ballistic missile delivery systems, to be solicited in one concentrated procurement package; this transfer to occur while prohibiting any International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) perceived harassment and upset in the IAEA's carrying out of its multilaterally agreed upon mandated duty to verify that nothing in those packages has, or will be, diverted to the development of nuclear weapons capacity

On that same day as spoke Mr. Barr of Kentucky; on 24 October 2017 and in the same edition of the Congressional Record, Congressperson Waters of California says (page H8101):

the rapid acceleration in the scale and range of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs is so alarming, including the launch of two intercontinental ballistic missiles in July, one of which experts believe could have had the capacity to reach the continental United States. Then, in September, the regime tested its sixth nuclear explosive device, and, according to U.S. and international estimates, this thermonuclear test was significantly higher in magnitude and yield than any previous test.


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